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In 1982, the Soviet Union began construction of a 3,000-mile pipeline
to supply natural gas to Western Europe.' To accomplish this massive
undertaking, the Soviet Union sought to obtain financial credit, equip-
ment, and technology from the West. On December 29, 1981, while the
natural gas pipeline was still under construction, President Reagan
barred U.S. companies from supplying pipeline equipment to the Soviet
Union. President Reagan's decision was motivated by a variety of policy
considerations, the most salient of which was the need to respond to the
declaration of martial law in Poland. On June 18, 1982, the President
broadened the ban to include all pipeline equipment manufactured by
Western firms under license from U.S. companies. These restrictions
were criticized by both domestic and international elites on political, eco-
nomic, and legal grounds. The dispute ended when an informal under-
standing was reached among the various members of the Atlantic
Alliance. On November 13, 1982, President Reagan announced the lift-
ing of the sanctions.
This dispute within the Atlantic Alliance raised questions among in-
ternational elites about the nature and extent of Alliance members'
peacetime responsibilities. The outcome of the incident seemed to affirm
an emerging norm that politico-military responsibilities of alliance mem-
bers could not be extended automatically to the peacetime trade of com-
mercial goods.2
t J.D. Candidate, Yale University; Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford University.
1. The Soviet pipeline, built in part with Western materials and financing, is now complete.
On January 1, 1984, France received the first deliveries of natural gas from the Soviet pipeline.
Chronology 1984, 63 FOREIGN Arr. 678 (1985) (America and the World 1984).
2. "Commercial goods" are defined here as those goods not having military application.
There is, however, an intermediate category of goods, such as aircraft engines, that have both
military and commercial applications. A central problem for security alliances is how to distin-
guish and categorize such goods. This study takes the position that pipeline equipment is in-
herently a commercial item that indirectly contributes to the development of Soviet military
power through the enhancement of Soviet economic power. Since this link is indirect, as well
as debatable, it is difficult to gauge the degree to which the commercial trade involved in the
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A. Norm Specification
Identification of an emerging norm is conditioned by many variables
and must be studied as part of an ongoing social process in which deci-
sions3 shaping the norm are made. This constitutive process4 must be
specified more closely in order to understand the impact of the pipeline
incident on international legal norms. Central to the task of norm speci-
fication in this incident is an examination of the concepts of alliances5
and "state management of trade."
'6
B. The Management of Alliance Behavior
In the post-World War II era, there has been a continuing tension
between the degree of independence with which states wish to act and the
requirements of alliance participation. The United Nations Charter cre-
ated a state system intended to facilitate the participation of territorial
entities in the international arena. Under Articles 1(2), 2(4), and 55, the
purposes of the United Nations were identified as resting on the respect
among nations for the principles of equal rights, self-determination, and
the territorial integrity of states.7 Yet, while the United Nations Charter
pipeline incident contributes to Soviet military power. It seems clear, however, that inclusion
of all forms of trade in the military category would mistakenly assume that every transaction
with the Soviets contributes to their military position.
3. Law may be conceived as a function of deci~igns characterized by expectations of both
authority and control that are communicated to target audiences. McDougal, Lasswell & Reis-
man, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW Es-
SAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 192 (M.
McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS].
4. Law is made within a constitutive process which involves the exercise of authoritative
power to provide an institutional framework for decisions and to allocate indispensable func-
tions and values. The particular decisions emerging from this process, which are termed "pub-
lic order" decisions, may be specialized to the shaping and sharing of particular values, such as
wealth. Id. at 191-192.
5. By alliance is meant a group of states, linked either formally through legal codification
or informally through common policies, which has as its basis a perceived commonality of
interests. Alliances have been distinguished according to their nature and relationship,
distribution of benefits and power, coverage in relation to the total interests of the nations
concerned, coverage in time, and effectiveness of common policies and actions. H. MORGAN-
THAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 177 (4th ed. 1967). This incident is concerned with the
interaction among the members of the Atlantic Alliance, best known by their military appella-
tion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
6. "State management of trade" refers to the ability of individual states to control their
international transactions with other states. As one of the leading works in the field of interna-
tional political economy notes:" [T]he nation-state has reaffirmed its power to shape strategies
of foreign economic policy." Katzenstein, Introduction.: Domestic and International Forces
and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY 4 (P. Katzen-
stein ed. 1978).
7. Articles 1(2), 2(4), and 55 articulate clearly the goals of a system of public order estab-
lished in the aftermath of World War II. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2: "To develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples. . .;" Art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
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has promoted state participation in the international system, it also has
sanctioned the formation of defensive alliances, ostensibly to protect the
integrity of the state system.8 Although Article 51, which embodies this
principle of "collective security," was drafted to cover collective re-
sponses to actual attack, the strategic problems of the nuclear age have
blurred the distinction between time of war and time of peace, and have
required the formation of peacetime alliances to deter threats both to the
security of states and to the state system.9 The practical effect of the
advent of peacetime alliances in the framework of a state system marked
by conflict has been to limit independent state participation in the inter-
national system.
Alliances have limited the autonomy of national elites in the interna-
tional process in at least two ways. First, within an alliance there always
exist categories of alliance responsibility (e.g., political, military, eco-
nomic) which are variable in scope and which are subject to extraterrito-
rial management among the members. 10 Second, alliances sometimes
have imposed limits upon the political independence of member states, or
of those states outside the affiance that represent strategic interests im-
portant to the alliance. Spheres of influence are set up to communicate
to adversaries the intent of the alliance to exclude outside influences and
to shape political decisions. Such exclusionary communications have
been conceptualized as "critical defense zones" and articulated by alli-
ances in such policies as the Monroe Doctrine, the Brezhnev Doctrine,
and the Carter Doctrine with its Reagan Codicil.' The limitation of
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;" Art. 55:
"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples. ... 
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations. .. ."
9. States that possess nuclear weapons and modem delivery systems may be able to exert
political influence over other states, especially those without nuclear weapons, within a partic-
ularly compressed time horizon. The ability of nuclear powers to use their influence to bring
about political results has been popularly referred to as "nuclear blackmail." Blackmail with
respect to foreign policy decisionmaking has been conceptualized in terms of "strategic" moves
in a dynamic process of communication and enforcement between states. See T. ScHELLING,
THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 119-161 (1963).
10. These categories of responsibility sometimes result from mutual agreement and at
other times are the product of the stronger members' imposition of their policy preferences on
the weaker. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 under
International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. Rv. 1308, 1330 (1983).
11. For an elaboration of the concept of "critical defense zones" and related notions, see
Reisman, Critical Defense Zones and International Law: The Reagan Codicil, 76 AM. J. INT'L
L. 589 (1982). For an examination of the Brezhnev Doctrine, see N. Rostow, Law and the Use
of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 209 (1981). See
Vol. 10:92, 1984
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political autonomy through such policies has exacerbated the tension, ba-
sic to alliance management, between the need for members to cooperate
for collective aims and their desire to pursue independent policies.
Alliance policies have often focused efforts on withholding power
economic, military, and diplomatic - from their adversaries. In order
for an alliance to be effective in carrying out such policies, it must have at
its foundation a high degree of shared interests. This cannot always be
presumed to exist among the members of peacetime alliances, which tend
to confine their concerns to a fraction of the total interests and objectives
of their members.12
Under a traditional "realist" analysis, 13 an insufficiency of shared in-
terests within an alliance can only be overcome by having strong leader-
ship by a powerful state.' 4 An oft-quoted remark of Thucydides captures
the essence of this view: "The strong do what they have the power to do
and the weak accept what they have to accept."' 5 In the pipeline inci-
dent, under a traditional, realist view of alliance behavior, the United
States might have been expected to use its political and military leverage
over its allies to enforce trade sanctions. This use of leverage would have
prevented the transfer of economic power in the form of credit and pipe-
line equipment to the Soviet Union and its allies. The inability of the
United States to enforce the sanctions suggests that political and military
dominance does not give to the leader of an alliance the power to regulate
commercial trade between the members of the alliance and their political
adversaries.16
C. State Management of Trade
Some analysts have concluded that attempts by the United States to
wield economic power through trade restrictions have had limited suc-
generally M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 175-186 (1981).
12. H. MORGANTHAU, supra note 5, at 179. During peacetime, the common interest in
unity against a "threat" is weakened, making coordinated policies more difficult to achieve.
13. Id. at 13-14.
14. R. KEOHANE & J. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 44 (1977). For a general
treatment of the problem of leadership in a world of fragmented interests, see Rosenau &
Holsti, United States Leadership in a Shrinking World, 35 WORLD POL. 368, 373 (1983).
15. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPENNESIAN WAR 402 (R. Warner trans. rev. ed. 1972).
16. Contemporary international relations theory has come to distinguish the effective uses
of power by states according to issue areas such as trade, finance, military, and ideology. Such
a mode of analysis is known as "issue structuralism." Its basic premise is that power re-
sources in one issue area do not predict effective power across issue areas. R. KEOHANE & J.
NYE, supra note 14, at 50.
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cess in the post-war period. 17 Efforts by the United States to get its allies
to act in concert for the purpose of denying political adversaries eco-
nomic power have met with even less success. In fact, attempts to re-
strict economic activity with such adversaries as the Soviet Union have
often resulted in heavy costs, including foregone gains from trade, intra-
alliance friction, increased solidarity within the opposing alliance, in-
creased Soviet self-sufficiency, albeit at a higher cost, and the growth of
bureaucracy as Atlantic Alliance members have tried to develop proce-
dures and controls for implementing the restrictions.18
A historical analysis of United States attempts to persuade the Atlan-
tic Alliance to restrict its trade with the Soviet Union reveals heightened
levels of strain within the Alliance. European members have shown in-
creasing reluctance to accept limitations on their authority to manage
their own trade relations.
The development of the Atlantic Alliance relationship in the economic
issue area may be organized into three phases. 19 During the first phase
(1948-68), U.S. policy-makers consistently took the position that the
commercial benefits the West might derive from trade with the Soviets
would be offset by the consequent strengthening of the Soviet military.20
Yet, the restrictive trade policies unilaterally formulated by the United
States received only grudging support from the European countries
whose economies'were recovering from war and adjusting to peacetime
conditions.
The United States sought to achieve compliance, in part, through leg-
islation. The Export Control Act of 1949,21 Section 117(d) of the Mar-
shall Plan,22 the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951,23 and
17. For a broad treatment of the uses of economic power in the post-World War II era, see
K. KNORR, POWER OF NATIONS 134-165 (1975).
18. Id. at 145.
19. For a more detailed treatment which divides the period into four phases, see 3.
Braathu, Unilateralism and Alliance Cohesion: The United States, Western Europe, and the
Regulation of Energy-Related Trade with the Soviet Union, 18 COOPERATON AND CONFLIcT
21, 27-38 (1983).
20. Id. at 26.
21. The Export Control Act of 1949 authorized the President to impose sanctions against
those countries contravening United States export regulations regarding the communist bloc.
Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2401 (1979)).
22. Section 117(d) of the Marshall Plan provided for the suspension of aid to any country
supplying goods embargoed by the United States to communist countries. Economic Coopera-
tion Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-472, 62 Stat. 137 (22 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1523 (repealed 1951 and
1954)).
23. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, commonly known as the Battle
Act, expanded American trade controls and authorized the President to cut off all military,
economic, and financial aid to countries that exported embargoed products to any nations
Vol. 10:92, 1984
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the 1962 Congressional amendments to the Export Control Act of
1949,24 were all efforts to extend U.S. law to the European allies in order
to obtain compliance with U.S. trade policies. Intergovernmental efforts
to obtain compliance focused on a coordinating committee (CoCom), set
up during 1949-50 to regulate and coordinate Alliance trade with the
Eastern bloc countries.25 The creation of CoCom did not resolve the
issue of the degree to which economic decisionmaking had to be shared
in order to achieve mutual security. Because CoCom can act only with
the unanimous agreement of its members, the problem for the United
States over time has been to get the rest of the Alliance not only to agree
on controls but also to implement them accordingly. In this early period,
such attempts were difficult; as time went by, agreement became impossi-
ble, especially with respect to goods that had purely commercial uses.
A key test in this early period came in 1962, in response to Soviet
attempts to construct the Druzhba oil pipeline to Eastern Europe.26 The
oil pipeline offered the prospect of increased oil supplies to the West and,
more immediately, of increased employment in West Germany and other
Western European countries receiving orders for steel pipe. The United
States attempted to block the transaction through CoCom and, when this
failed, tried to gain leverage over its allies by obtaining an informal
NATO resolution opposing the sale. Notwithstanding these efforts, the
"threatening the security of the United States." Pub. L. No. 82-213, 63 Stat. 479 (1961) (cur-
rent version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613d (1970)).
24. The 1962 amendments to the Export Control Act of 1949 granted the President discre-
tionary power to deny trade licenses if the products in question were deemed to make a "signif-
icant contribution to the military or economic potential of the adversary." Pub. L. No. 87-515,
76 Stat. 127, § 4 (1962) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2023, 2025 & 2032 (1976)).
25. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls (CoCom) in-
cludes Japan and all NATO countries except Iceland. CoCom is a forum in which trade deci-
sions are examined. CoCom was created by informal agreement among its members and
works on the principle of unanimous agreement. CoCom has three major functions: 1) to
establish and update lists of embargoed products and technologies; 2) to act as a clearinghouse
for requests submitted by members for shipping goods to proscribed countries; and 3) to coor-
dinate administration and enforcement activity among member nations. See Buckley, Control
of Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1982, at 71, 72. There are
essentially three categories of controls: a) munitions, b) atomic energy, and c) industrial com-
mercial. There are also three levels of control: a) total embargo, b) quantitative limits, and c)
surveillance. See Braathu, supra note 19, at 40 n. 13. It is important to remember that CoCom
has no formal treaty or charter and is not officially part of any organization. See 3 A.
LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITIcAL ENDS 11-12 (1977). CoCom functioned, in
the past, because of a shared perception of threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. How-
ever, as:
1) European countries became less dependent on aid; 2) technological superiority of the United States both
vis-i-vis Western Europe and vis-i-vis the East narrowed; and 3) perceptions of the communist threat de-
clined faster in Europe and Japan than in the United States, CoCom and the multilateral denial effort in
general became less effective and more subject to disagreements. Id. at 13.
26. Braathu, supra note 19, at 29. See also Mufson, United States Effort to Block Soviet
Gas Pipeline Recalls Failed Embargo of Twenty Years Ago, Wall St. J., July 14, 1982, at 32,
ol. 1.
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British, Italians, Swedes, and Japanese fulfilled their contracts.
Although the West Germans eventually yielded to United States pres-
sure, their compliance came at the expense of a parliamentary crisis.
27
The second period (1969-1974) was marked by a reversal of the U.S.
policy of trade denial. As part of its strategy of detente, the U.S. tried to
use trade incentives to influence Soviet foreign policy. The Export Ad-
ministration Act of 196928 narrowed the definition of national security
under which the restrictions had been justified.29 In addition, it removed
references to the "economic potential" that American trade would pre-
sumably bestow on the Soviet Union.
30
The interlude provided by detente allowed the West Europeans to ex-
pand their economic ties with the Soviet Union and its allies. Increasing
Soviet supply of energy to Western Europe raised the possibility of a link
between Europe's energy security and the continuation of nonconfronta-
tional policies toward the Soviet Union. While there remained categories
of trade that were subject to restriction, such as nuclear or military tech-
nology, independence of action in the commercial area was expanded.
The third phase (1975-present) saw renewed restrictions on United
States exports to the Soviet Union. With the Jackson-Vanik amendment
to the Trade Reform Bill of 197331 and the Stevenson Amendment to the
Export-Import Bank Act of December, 1974,32 Congress tied economic
exchange to Soviet domestic policies. The United States by this time had
come to question the policy of detente, and had returned to a strategy of
trade denial to further the policy goals of the Atlantic Alliance.
33
27. Mufson, supra note 26.
28. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (current version
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1979)).
29. Id. at §§ 3-4. The concept and scope of national security has expanded over time. See
Export Administration Act of 1979, §§ 2, 3 & 5, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1979)).
30. Congress limited its findings regarding the adverse impact of unrestricted trade on
national security to trade making a contribution to the military potential of other nations. See
supra note 28, at § 2(2).
31. After eighteen months of executive-congressional debate starting in 1973, Senator
Jackson, in October 1974, announced a compromise, under which Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean trade benefits would be made conditional upon a relaxation of Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean emigration policies. J. SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 317 (2d ed. 1981); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (19
U.S.C. § 2431 (1982)); see also 119 Cong. Rec. 11,549 (1973).
32. The Stevenson Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act killed both the "North
Star" and Yakutsk gas projects, which were crucial to American-Soviet energy cooperation, by
imposing severe credit limitations. See Braathu, supra note 19, at 33.
33. In response to the Afghanistan invasion, the United States tried without success to
obtain the support of its European allies for trade control measures. See Braathu, supra note
19, at 37. For a general analysis of the failures of detente, see Breslauer, Why Detente Failed:
An Interpretation, in MANAGING UNITED STATEs-SoVIET RIVALRY 319 (A. George ed.
1983).
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This return to a strategy of trade denial was largely the result of the
failure of the Carter Administration to influence Soviet foreign policy
through diplomatic or military channels. In July 1978, the Carter Ad-
ministration retaliated against Soviet treatment of dissidents and Ameri-
can journalists by limiting computer sales and oil drilling equipment to
the Soviet Union.34 In December 1979, the administration tried broadly
to restrict exports to the Soviet Union, including grain and advanced
technology, in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.35 These
economic measures only served to bring to the surface differences be-
tween the U.S. and its allies over cooperation in denying trade to the
Soviets. In fact, after both Carter Administration decisions, the Soviets
were able to fill their needs by trade with other capitalist countries.36
II. Facts
The construction of the 3,000 mile pipeline to bring natural gas from
the Urengoi fields in Siberia to the West European gas network is an
important part of Soviet political and energy planning. The Soviets plan
eventually to export 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to
Western Europe, tripling their current export level. 37 Since 1978, when
the Soviets first proposed the construction of a natural gas pipeline from
Siberia,38 it was apparent that pipe and equipment from Western Europe
and Japan and credit from Western banks would be essential if the pipe-
line were to be completed on time. 39
On June 24, 1981, members of Congress, led by Senator Jake Garn (R-
Utah), sent a letter to President Reagan expressing concern that the pipe-
line would endanger Western security and suggesting alternatives to
West European participation in the pipeline.4° The legislators feared that
Western Europe could become susceptible to blackmail if it relied on the
Soviet Union for a substantial portion of its supply of natural gas. In
July, when a consortium of German banks, led by Deutsche Bank and
34. Spero, supra note 31, at 319.
35. Id. at 319-20.
36. Id. at 320.
37. J. HARDT & D. GOLD, SOVIET GAS PIPELINE: UNITED STATES OPTIONS 1 (Cong.
Research Service Issue Brief 82020, 1982) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
38. The Urengoi field on the Tal Peninsula in western Siberia is the largest gas field in the
world, and will add the equivalent of four million barrels of oil per day to Soviet gas produc-
tion. Stern, Specters and Pipe Dreams, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1982, at 21-22.
39. Soviet motives in seeking Western technology and financing are discussed in Loeber
and Friedland, Soviet Imports of Industrial Installations Under Compensation Agreements:
West Europe's Siberia Pipeline Revisited, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Winter 1983, at 51, 57.
40. This fact and others in this section were derived from a chronology set forth in J.
HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 12-20.
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the AKA Ausfuhrkredit GMbH, agreed to provide some 3.4 billion DM
in credits for the compressor stations, President Reagan tried unsuccess-
fully at the Ottawa Economic Summit (July 19-21) to persuade the West
European leaders to abandon their support of the Soviet pipeline.41 By
the end of 1981, Western European countries had become deeply in-
volved in the project, to the frustration of the U.S. administration.
In September 1981, Nuovo Pignone of Italy agreed to supply nineteen
compressor stations for the pipeline.42 Also in September, the Soviet
equipment trading agency signed an agreement with Mannesman (FRG)
and Creusot-Loire (France) to supply twenty-two compressor stations
for the pipeline.43 In November, the Soviet Union and Ruhrgas A.G.
(FRG) signed an agreement on the price and quantity of natural gas to
be delivered by the pipeline until the year 2006.44 Of greater concern to
the United States was French approval, on December 10, of the sale by
Thomas-CSF of electronic systems for controlling the flow of gas in the
pipeline. Analysts in the United States government felt that this was a
particularly dangerous sale because it included computer technology that
might be used by the Soviets to further their military development.
45
Europeans, who by this point had become accustomed to making their
own decisions about trade with the Eastern bloc, did not share the U.S.
attitude. The lack of consensus on this issue foreshadowed the tensions
which the 1982 pipeline incident would bring about.
The imposition of martial law in Poland on December 29 served as the
catalyst that forced a showdown over the issue of collective trade policy
among the members of the Atlantic Alliance. President Reagan declared
that the Soviets bore heavy responsibility for the imposition of martial
law and announced a series of sanctions against the Soviet Union that
included the suspension of exports of oil and gas equipment and other
high technology equipment to the Soviets.4 6 These sanctions stripped
away the image of alliance "neutrality" and had an immediate impact,
not only on the Soviets, but also on West European countries, many of
whose contractors used U.S. licensed technology in completing their con-
tracts with the Soviet Union.
On January 8, 1982, the General Electric Company announced that its
41. See J. HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 20.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Interviews, U.S. Department of State officials, July 1984 [on file with the Yale Journal
of International Law].
46. Id. at 18-19. See also Joffe, Europe and America: The Politics of Resentment (cont'd)
61 FOREIGN AFF. 569, 571 (1983) (America and the World 1982).
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application for a license to export $175 million worth of rotors and other
components for compressor stations had been denied by the Commerce
Department. The company was a subcontractor for John Brown (Eng-
land), Nuovo Pignone (Italy) and AEG-Telefunken (FRG) which had
agreed to supply compressor stations to the Soviets.47 European reaction
to the implementation of United States policy was swift. On January 13,
1982, West German Economic Minister Otto von Lambsdorff told the
Cabinet that the Government's pledge not to undermine United States
sanctions only applied to new contracts and those contracts for which a
United States firm was the prime contractor.48 This distinction appeared
to exclude the German compressor contracts for which General Electric
was a subcontractor. On the same day, Gaz de France signed a twenty-
five year agreement with the Soviets to purchase gas from the pipeline
beginning in 1986. This agreement was followed by a second one on
February 10, by a group of French banks, granting a credit of $140 mil-
lion to the Soviets to finance purchases of equipment for the pipeline
from French companies. 49 On January 29, Italy's state energy agency
announced that it had completed a similar agreement on the price and
quantity of Soviet gas to be delivered.50 On February 2, the Japanese
Export-Import Bank announced that Komatsu would be allowed to com-
plete its sale of pipe-laying equipment to the Soviet Union.51 The ma-
chines were similar to an embargoed pipelayer made by Caterpillar in the
United States. Thus, it seemed as if the United States response to the
imposition of martial law in Poland would be accompanied by undimin-
ished economic contacts and cooperative ventures between the U.S. allies
and the Soviets. It was as if a general had charged into battle without the
troops.
The Reagan Administration tried, without success, to convince its al-
lies that "commercial prudence with the Soviets was needed for mainte-
nance of their security interests."'52 U.S. frustration over the allies'
refusal to commit themselves to a policy of trade sanctions peaked on
June 6, during the Versailles Economic Summit, when the most that the
alliance could agree to was a communique indicating their good
intentions.
53
Having failed to secure voluntary cooperation, the Reagan Adminis-
47. J. HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 18.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 17-18.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id.
52. Joffe, supra note 46, at 574.
53. Id.
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tration turned to more coercive measures to achieve a "coordinated" pol-
icy. On June 18, President Reagan extended the embargo to encompass
not only American pipeline suppliers, but also their subsidiaries and
licensees in France, Germany, England, and Italy. Unlike the denial of
export licenses to U.S. suppliers, this action had a real chance of damag-
ing the gas pipeline by closing off the last conduit for those crucial com-
ponents embodying superior American turbine technology.
54
The expanded embargo only generated increased European resistance.
On June 22, foreign ministers of the European Economic Community
(EEC) countries issued a statement asserting that the extended ban on oil
and gas equipment violated international law in attempting to impose
American jurisdiction over European contracts. On July 22, the French
government officially ordered those companies involved in the pipeline
deal to honor their contracts despite U.S. actions.55 On July 24, the
Italian Foreign Ministry publicly stated that Italian contracts with the
Soviet Union would be honored.56 On August 3, in accordance with the
provisions of the 1980 Protection of Trading Interests Act,5 7 Lord
Cockfield, the British Trade Secretary, ordered four companies produc-
ing equipment in Britain under U.S. license - American Air Filter,
Baker Oil Tools, Smith International, and John Brown Engineering - to
honor their contracts with the U.S.S.R.58 Finally, on August 12, the
EEC issued a formal protest in response to President Reagan's expansion
of the ban on pipeline equipment.
5 9
By the end of August, members of the Reagan Administration were
beginning to realize that the continuing confrontation was counter-
productive. On August 31, senior advisors recommended to President
Reagan that he look for ways to compromise with those European com-
panies violating his pipeline embargo. On September 9, the administra-
tion imposed limited sanctions against the British company John Brown
after it shipped six turbines to the U.S.S.R.60 On October 5, the United
States imposed limited sanctions against four West German companies.
61
Finally on November 13, after almost a year of conflict, the Reagan
54. Id.
55. J. HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 16.
56. Id.
57. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
58. J. HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 15.
59. Id.
60. U.S. courts deferred to the authority of the political branches during the pipeline dis-
pute. See Dresser Industries Inc. & Dresser (France) S.A. v. Baldridge, 549 F.Supp. 108, 110
(D.D.C. 1982) (denying injunctive relief to companies penalized for violation of the Reagan
Administration pipeline ban).
61. J. HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 13.
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Administration lifted the sanctions altogether.6 2
III. Conflicting Claims
The U.S. and its allies had different perspectives on the strategy of
trade denial. The arguments each side offered often reflected narrow
conceptions of self-interest rather than any principled basis for alliance
policy. In addition, each side engaged in selective distortions of reality
and manipulations of "hard" data in order to further its interpretation.
A. United States Claims
The Reagan Administration offered three principal arguments against
West European participation in the pipeline project.63 These were given
varying emphasis at different points in the dispute. Initially, the Ameri-
can case stressed the danger of increasing energy dependence on a power-
ful opponent. 64 The United States argued that dependence on Soviet
natural gas (at least thirty percent of West European natural gas needs)
and equipment orders (between ten and fifteen billion dollars over the
next five years) would make West European participants vulnerable to
Soviet threats to cut off supplies or terminate orders in a crisis. 65 Ana-
lysts cited Yugoslavia (1948), Israel (1956), Albania (1961), and China
(1962) as instances in which the Soviets had interrupted energy exports
to achieve political gains. 66 After the imposition of martial law in Poland
in December 1981, the Reagan Administration couched its arguments for
sanctions in terms of political morality. The United States asserted that
failure to support sanctions implied consent for the suppression of the
Polish trade union, Solidarity. 67 Finally, the United States argued that
the transfer of Western technology, subsidized credit, and hard currency
would aid the Soviet military buildup, making the task of maintaining
Atlantic security much harder.68 Arguing against this "contribution" to
Soviet power, the United States tried to distinguish the pipeline situation
from its October 15, 1982 decision to sell grain to the Soviet Union. The
Reagan Administration argued that European gas purchases would con-
tribute vital resources to the Soviet economy, while U.S. grain sales had
extracted billions of dollars in cash which would have been used to sup-
62. Id. at 12.
63. Joffe, supra note 46, at 574.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 570 (U.S. perspective on West European energy dependence). See J. HARDT &
D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 1 (U.S. estimate of value of equipment orders).
66. Joffe, supra note 46, at 570 n.1.
67. Id. at 571.
68. Id.
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port a further Soviet military buildup. 69
The administration's arguments not only inspired sharp criticism from
abroad, but divided the United States foreign policy community. Two
schools of thought could be identified. 70 One group, led by Secretary of
Defense Weinberger and Senator Gan, stressed that Europe would be-
come hostage to the Soviet Union if the deals were completed, and that
the transactions would be beneficial to the Soviet military.71 The other
group, represented by Richard Lesher and Donald Campbell of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, argued that United States pressure
could not stop the pipeline from being built,72 and could only undermine
the alliance. The Weinberger group eventually forced this school to yield
to its concerns about the possible "Finlandization" of Western Europe.
73
B. European Claims
The West European allies generally suppoited increased imports of
natural gas and oil from the Soviet Union as well as increased sales of
energy equipment on competitive credit terms. Three reasons
predominated. First, it was argued that any addition of energy to the
world market would help hold down prices. 74 Energy security is per-
ceived differently in the United States than in Western Europe and Ja-
pan. In the latter countries, where energy independence is not possible,
decisionmaking elites see energy security as a product of diversification
of supply. Analysts questioned how much coal the United States could
export to Western Europe in an emergency, and how much coal the West
Europeans could substitute for gas, given their existing energy infrastruc-
ture.75 Second, it was argued that largeequipment orders would be bene-
ficial to stagnant European and Japanese metallurgy and machinery
sectors, providing certain employment and production prospects for
69. Id. at 572.
70. J. HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 3-4.
71. Members of the "Weinberger" group searched for ways to delay, if not to stop, the
pipeline. Some recommendations included: a) all-out legal and political efforts to use the lev-
erage conferred by the General Electric patents on the pipeline technology; b) an offer of
United States coal to replace all or part of the additional deliveries of Soviet gas from the
pipeline; and c) tying human rights requirements to equipment sales for the pipeline with a
requirement of proof that "forced labor" was not being used in the construction of the pipeline.
Id at 3.
72. Members of the "Lesher" group favored the development of additional coal exports
that might serve as a "safety net" against threats of political pressure by the Soviet Union. Id.
at 5.
73. "Finlandization" refers to that process or state of affairs in which, under the cloak of
maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of a country becomes
reduced. Laqueur, Europe: The Specter of Finlandization, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1977, at 37.
74. J. HARDT & D. GOLD, supra note 37, at 3.
75. Id. at 5.
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many years to come.76 Finally, it was asserted that economic interdepen-
dence with the East would stabilize political relations and provide room
for Western Europe to maneuver in a crisis.77
Perceptions of each of the European allies about pipeline policy
seemed to vary with the extent of its economic stake in the project.78
West Germany took the leading role in the pipeline trade, partly because
of its experience of twenty years earlier in the Druzhba pipeline affair,
and partly because of its large economic interest in the project. West
Germany is expected to buy about 30% of the gas and has the largest
contracts to provide equipment of any ally. Each year for twenty-five
years, beginning in 1986, it will import 370 billion cubic feet of natural
gas. Equipment supply contracts for West German companies total
about $1 billion and promise at least 1,000 new jobs. 79 With so much at
stake, it is no wonder that the Frankfurter Rundschau, on November 19,
1982, called the American sanctions policy "the biggest flop of the
year.,,
80
France supported the pipeline project by lending money directly to the
Soviet Union. A consortium of three banks, led by Credit Lyonnais, of-
fered $850 million of credits at 7.8% interest to cover 85% of the cost of
pipeline equipment to be purchased in France. The loan would be repay-
able over ten years and would be insured by a quasi-public agency under
the supervision of the French government. 81 Gaz de France, a govern-
ment-owned company, agreed to buy 280 billion cubic feet of natural gas
a year from the pipeline over the next twenty-five years. This would
double the current level of French gas purchases from the Soviet
Union.82 Not surprisingly, Le Monde joined the German press in its con-
demnation of the American' sanctions, asserting that the embargo had
done more damage to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance which Presi-
dent Reagan had wanted to strengthen, than to the Soviet Union which
President Reagan had wanted to punish.8 3
Britain had pipeline contracts valued at about $383 million, spread
among a dozen firms. Of that amount, $228 million worth of contracts
76. Id. at 3.
77. There is at least one economic model that indicates a negative relationship between
conflict and trade. See Polachek, Conflict and Trade, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 55 (1980).
78. Mufson, United States is in a Sharp Fight With European Allies, Wall St. J., Aug. 31,
1982, at 29, col. 1 (detailing the economic stakes involved for each of the allies).
79. Id. at col. 2.
80. Joffe, supra note 46, at 575.
81. Mufson, supra note 78, at col. 3.
82. Id.
83. Joffe, supra note 46, at 574-75.
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were affected by the United States regulations.84
Italy was also heavily committed to the pipeline project. It agreed to
buy about 280 million cubic feet of natural gas a year for twenty years at
a price of $4 per thousand cubic feet. This contract gave the Italians the
best price of any member of the alliance. Credit granted by Italy covered
as much as 85% of the roughly $1 billion in contracts granted by the
Soviets to Italian companies.85 The Italians instructed their companies
to fulfill their contracts, but "sincerely" sought "frank and fair discus-
sions"8 6 between Washington and the European community over the
dispute.
. The dispute over pipeline policy offers an example of the problems of
perception and misperception in international relations.8 7 The European
allies could argue that 5-6% dependence on Soviet energy exports (in-
cluding gas, oil, and uranium) would not possibly lead to European vul-
nerability in times of political crisis. The United States, on the other
hand, could offer the picture of 30% dependence on Soviet natural gas
(excluding other energy sources) as the more accurate indicator of Euro-
pean vulnerability.88 The Europeans continually claimed that the U.S.
position was inconsistent.8 9 They questioned whether the link between
American sanctions and martial law in Poland, if successful in pressuring
the Poles to lift martial law, would also eliminate European dependence
and dampen Soviet military capabilities. They also doubted whether
assistance to their domestic steel industries in obtaining pipeline equip-
ment sales was any different from President Reagan's appeasement of
midwestern grain farmers in the United States with their problems of
overproduction and falling prices. These European doubts received addi-
tional support from a study by Wharton Econometrics 90 based on the
principles of comparative economic advantage, which showed that the
Soviet Union, a lackluster grain producer, was better off buying grain
abroad and devoting saved resources to energy production. With re-
sources saved from the import of grain, the Soviets could develop more
energy supplies. These, in turn, could be sold to Europe, producing prof-
its that might be used either to buy more American grain or to increase
military spending.
84. Mufson, supra note 78, at col. 4.
85. Id.
86. Painton, Imbroglio Over a Pipeline, Time, Aug. 2, 1982, at 30.
87. See generally R. JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS (1976).
88. Joffe, supra note 46, at 570.
89. d at 571.
90. WHARTON ECONOMETRIC FORECASTING ASSOCIATES, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
IN SOVIET GRAIN AND ENERGY TRADE (1982). See also Joffe, supra note 46, at 572.
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IV. Conflicting Conceptions of Lawfulness
Both the United States and the European allies developed legal argu-
ments to reinforce and legitimize their respective policy claims. These
arguments illustrated the differing perspectives of the two sides on the
nature of the collective security system to which they belonged.
A. U.S. Claims
U.S. legal claims were developed along three lines. First, the Reagan
Administration placed the controls in the context of U.S. foreign policy
and the international obligations of the alliance. Second, the adminis-
tration argued that the European allies had accepted the risk of U.S. ex-
port controls in contracting for the use of U.S. technology and
equipment. Third, the U.S. claimed that "reasonable" extraterritorial
extensions of jurisdiction were permissible under international law, and
that, given the shared policy of alliance security, U.S. export controls
were "reasonable."
With respect to the first claim, the United States crafted a broadly
conceived argument based on its reading of an "agreement" by the Alli-
ance. On June 6, 1982, two weeks before the extension of export controls
to the European allies, the leaders of the Western Alliance held a sum-
mit meeting at Versailles. Despite "some disagreement," the U.S. ex-
pressed satisfaction over the degree to which the allies had managed to
agree on a common approach to the management of East-West economic
relations. In the American view, the summit countries had agreed to
"pursue a prudent and diversified economic approach with respect to the
USSR and Eastern Europe, consistent with U.S. political and security
interests."91 One reason for this expansive view of what had been accom-
plished at Versailles may have been the pledge to improve consultative
mechanisms within CoCom in order both to exercise stricter control over
exports of strategic goods to Warsaw Pact countries and to coordinate
national arrangements for the enforcement of security controls.92 Given
U.S. preoccupation with East-West security considerations, 93 and an al-
91. Meissner, United States Approach to East- West Economic Relations, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Sept. 1982, at 30. Cf. Joffe, supra note 46, at 574 (describing differing interpretations of the
Versailles summit).
92. Meissner, supra note 91, at 30.
93. Id. at 31. The United States made three principal arguments in support of its broad
conception of the "security" threat. First, the United States believed that because of the
"heavy responsibility" that the Soviet Union bore for the imposition of martial law in Poland,
it could not be rewarded by business as usual in foreign economic relations. Id. Second, Soviet
"intimidation" served to underline the danger that the European allies would be jeopardizing
their security by becoming dependent on Soviet energy supplies. Joffe, supra, note 46, at 571.
Finally, the United States asserted that Soviet ability to affect political outcomes in other
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ready inflated view of what was achieved at the summit, the United
States may have read into this pledge a solid commitment to the use of
sanctions. The U.S. did acknowledge that East-West trade plays a
greater role in the economies of the European allies than in that of the
United States, but nevertheless considered the value of a common sanc-
tions policy to outweigh the economic costs to each state.
94
The second U.S. claim was that the European allies had assumed the
risk of sanctions by agreeing to clauses in trade contracts stipulating
that the licensee or purchaser would abide by U.S. regulations in selling
U.S. technology or products incorporating U.S. technology to third
countries.95 Since these clauses had been in use since the 1950S, 96 the
U.S. could argue that the possibility of sanctions, no matter how un-
likely, should have been factored into the assessment of business risk.
The third U.S. claim was that U.S. export control regulations could
legitimately be extended to European subsidiaries of American corpora-
tions and to licensees of U.S. technology because they involved "reason-
able" extensions of jurisdiction.97 In assessing the "reasonableness" of
U.S. jurisdiction, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State at-
tempted to balance U.S. perceptions of the collective interests of the alli-
ance against allied perceptions of their respective national interests.98
states - Soviet power - should not be enhanced through trade with the West in such critical
technology. Id. Benefits to the Soviets from "exploiting" the West's advanced technology in-
cluded: a) saving billions of dollars by acquiring proven Western technology; b) saving years
of research time; c) narrowing the technological gap with the West; d) avoiding time consum-
ing errors; and e) knowing in advance that new systems win work properly and knowing where
to look should a product falter. For an analysis of the advantages of CoCom controls in
countering Soviet gains from exploiting Western advanced technology, see Mally, Technology
Transfer Controls, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1982, at 52, 54.
94. Buckley, The Case for Sanctions Against the Soviet Union, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept.
1982, at 37, 38. See also Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST,
BULL., June 1983, at 48, 52.
95. J. HARDT, SOVIET GAS PIPELINE: U.S. SANCTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
(Cong. Research Service Issue Paper 0219S, 1982)(on file with the Yale Journal of Interna-
tional Law).
96. Id.
97. Robinson, Economic Regulation and International Jurisdictional Conflict, DEP'T ST,
BULL., Oct. 1982, at 37.
98. Id. The Legal Adviser's approach in developing a "rule of reasonableness" required
weighing and balancing factors including, inter alia: a) links such as nationality, residence, or
economic activity between the regulating state and the persons responsible for the activity
taken; b) the importance of regulation to the regulating state; c) extent of the "other" states'
interests in the activity; and d) the existence of potential conflict with regulation by other
states. Id. The State Department acknowledged that its balancing methodology was derived
from decisions in U.S. courts such as Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. &
S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287 (3rd Cir. 1979). Id. This balancing approach is also reflected in Section 403 of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Draft No.
7, Jan. 18, 1985).
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Although the United States admitted that the balancing approach could
not resolve all intra-alliance controversies, the economic needs of some
alliance members were seen as subsidiary to the overriding concern for
collective security.
The U.S. claimed that its extension of jurisdiction to foreign country
activities was part of a pattern of practice long accepted in international
relations.99 This is not to say that the U.S. was oblivious to the problems
created between the U.S. and its European allies by extensions of U.S.
jurisdiction, particularly in the antitrust area.1°° The administration
maintained, however, that its assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign sub-
sidiary of a U.S. corporation or the licensee of U.S. technology fit a con-
sistent historical pattern of practice where substantial U.S. interests were
involved.101
U.S. legal arguments thus focussed on the reasonable foreseeability of
the extension of sanctions. The U.S. view was that its allies' obligations
to the Alliance included a commitment to view their economic coopera-
tion with the Soviets in terms of security goals and politico-military
power. Moreover, the contractual stipulations should have put the
Europeans on notice that sanctions could be imposed. Finally, the exten-
sion of sanctions to European subsidiaries of U.S. firms should have been
expected, given the historical pattern of U.S. extensions of jurisdiction.
B. European Claims
Although the dispute among the allies began with the announcement
of sanctions on December 30, 1981, from the European point of view, the
real conflict did not begin until the extension of sanctions to American
subsidiaries and license-holders in Europe on June 18, 1982. These re-
strictions were crucial because they directly affected European compa-
nies and threatened to cut off a vital conduit for equipment needed for
the pipeline.
European legal arguments focused on two claims. 10 2 First, the allies
asserted that the U.S. regulations, as amended June 22, 1982,103 con-
99. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1983, at
48.
100. Id. at 48, 49.
101. Id. at 50.
102. For a full elaboration of the European legal arguments, see European Communities:
Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 589, 891-904
(1982).
103. On June 22, 1982, the Department of Commerce, at the direction of President Reagan
and pursuant to 6 of the 1979 Export Administration Act, supra note 29, amended
§§ 376.12, 379.8, and 385.2 of the Export Administration Regulations. 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.12,
379.8, 385.2. These amendments expanded coverage of existing United States controls on the
109
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 10:92, 1984
tained sweeping extensions of U.S. jurisdiction violative of international
law. Second, they claimed that the new regulations, and the way in
which they affected contracts in the course of performance, ran counter
to the guidelines of the 1979 Export Administration Act'04 and to "prin-
ciples of U.S. public law."
105
The first claim, concerning extension of U.S. jurisdiction, was analyzed
by the Europeans under four different jurisdictional principles of interna-
tional law - the territoriality principle, the protective principle, the na-
tionality principle, and the effects principle. Analysis of each principle
led the Europeans to conclude that U.S. measures were unacceptable
under international law. The territoriality principle10 6 supports the right
of each state, as part of the state system created by the U.N. Charter,
freely to organize and develop its social and economic system. The
Europeans argued that U.S. measures infringed upon this principle by
attempting to regulate the activities of European companies that were
not within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Anticipating
American arguments about their security obligations under the Atlantic
Alliance, the Europeans noted that the U.S. might have grounded its
claims on the "protective principle" of jurisdiction. This principle allows
a state jurisdiction over acts committed outside its territory that threaten
its security.10 7 Whether or not this principle might have been available
to the United States, the Europeans pointed out that it "was not invoked
by the U.S. government, since the regulations were based on § 6 (foreign
policy controls) and not on § 5 (national security controls) of the 1979
export and reexport of goods and technical data relating to oil and gas exploration. The
Europeans understood the regulations, as amended, to provide that: a) persons (individuals,
corporations and partnerships) within a third country could not reexport machinery of U.S.
origin without the permission of the U.S. government if it was for the exploration and produc-
tion of oil and natural gas; b) persons subject to United States jurisdiction were required to get
prior written authorization by the Office of Export Administration for the export or reexport
to the Soviet Union of non-United States goods and technical data related to oil and gas explo-
ration; and c) no person in the United States or in a foreign country could export or reexport
to the Soviet Union foreign products directly derived from United States technical data relat-
ing to machinery utilized for the exploration and production of oil or natural gas. I.L.M.,
supra note 102, at 891-892 (1982) (summary of regulations).
104. See supra note 29.
105. I.L.M., supra note 102, at 891.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 17 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. See also M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1295 (1981). The territoriality principle has
been interpreted to mean that a state should restrict its rulemaking to persons and goods
within its territory. It also means that an organization such as the European Community
should restrict applicability of its rules to the territory to which the treaty creating it applies.
I.L.M., supra note 102, at 893 (1982).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 106, at § 30.33. See also M. McDOUOAL & W.
REISMAN, supra note 106, at 1319.
110
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Export Administration Act."108
The nationality principle, authorizing prescriptions of rules for nation-
als wherever they are,10 9 was also rejected by the Europeans as a basis for
the extension of U.S. jurisdiction. The Europeans objected to the notion
that the U.S. could impose its corporate nationality controls on Euro-
pean companies given that "the great majority were incorporated in Eu-
ropean states." 110 Further, they added that there were no rules for
determining the nationality of goods and technology under international
law, 11 and that judicial decisions indicated that U.S. jurisdiction did not
follow goods of U.S. origin once they had been discharged in the territory
of another country. 112 Finally, the Europeans argued that the "effects
principle"113 was not applicable because exports from European mem-
bers were deemed to have no "direct, foreseeable, and substantial" effect
on U.S. trade.
The second European claim was that the U.S. controls did not satisfy
the criteria laid down in the 1979 Export Administration Act. 114 The
Europeans argued that there was little probability that controls would
achieve foreign policy purposes.1 15 They urged that there was no reason
to assume that the Soviets would be unable to develop their own technol-
ogy, albeit at a greater cost, in order to complete the project and make
the U.S. pipeline policy ineffective. The Europeans also argued that the
probable reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of
export controls had received insufficient consideration as required by the
Act. 116 Finally, the Europeans claimed that the export controls would
cast doubt on the United States as a reliable supplier, both in sales of
equipment and in technology licensing arrangements.
1 7
108. See supra note 29.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 106, at § 30. See also M. McDOUGAL & W.
REISMAN, supra note 106, at 1370-72.
110. I.L.M., supra note 102, at 894.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 106 at § 18. The Europeans referred to the
"effects doctrine," which grants jurisdiction over conduct outside the territory that causes
direct, foreseeable, and substantial effects within the territory. I.L.M., supra note 106, at 896
(1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 106).
114. Congress attempted to circumscribe Presidential power by requiring the application
of specified criteria when imposing, expanding, or extending export controls for foreign policy
reasons. For an elaboration of these criteria, see 50 U.S.C. § 2405(b) (1982).
115. I.L.M., supra note 102, at 901-02.
116. Id. at 902.
117. Id.
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V. Outcome
The ban on the sale of pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union by U.S.
firms, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms and foreign companies manufac-
turing under U.S. licenses was lifted on November 13, 1982. President
Reagan, in a radio address to the nation, announced that the United
States and its allies had come to an informal agreement on trade policy
with the Soviet Union. 18 The President claimed that this "understand-
ing" with the European allies would be more effective than the sanc-
tions, 119 and that the latter were now obsolete. The President
highlighted three aspects of this agreement that established a "policy in
the economic area to complement our policies in the security area.
120
First, no new contracts for the purchase of Soviet natural gas would be
signed during the course of an alliance study of alternative Western
sources of energy. Second, the United States and its allies would
strengthen controls on the transfer of strategic items to the Soviet Union.
Third, procedures would be established for monitoring financial relations
with the Soviet Union which would be consistent with alliance export
credit policies.
121
In order to put this outcome in the proper focus so that it might be
appraised for its impact on community expectations, 122 two points must
be made. First, as mentioned above, the natural gas contracts that the
European allies signed with the Soviet Union were all long-term agree-
ments: West Germany-twenty-five years; France-twenty-five years; It-
aly-twenty years. As a result, the first aspect of this "informal
agreement" had no operative significance since the allies' present needs
would be satisfied by existing contracts. Second, this "informal agree-
ment" contained no mention of future limitations on sales contracts of
pipeline equipment. Thus, while U.S. policy changed with the lifting of
the sanctions, it is important to note that European behavior remained
basically unaltered.
VI. International Appraisal
Although the political rhetoric on each side of the Atlantic still re-
flected the differing perspectives of the parties, the arguments used by
118. East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan.
1983, at 28. (Text of President Reagan's address to the nation, Nov. 13, 1982) [hereinafter




122. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 3, at 285.
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each in appraisal of the outcome indicated a recognition that politico-
military responsibilities of alliance members could not automatically be
extended to the peacetime trade of commercial goods.
A. U.S. Appraisal
U.S. appraisal of the pipeline incident was marked both by reluctance
to admit the rejection of its policies by its allies, and by uncertainty over
how to address European assertions of independence in the choice of
trading partners. The Reagan Administration originally couched its de-
cision to lift the pipeline sanctions in language that gave the impression
of a united alliance in agreement over a future course of action that
would be even more effective against the Soviet Union. 123 Yet it is ap-
parent that this settlement was less a shift from one agreed-upon policy
to another than a realization by the United States that it could not effec-
tively translate alliance responsibilities in the politico-military issue area
into the economic issue area. As President Reagan admitted in lifting the
sanctions: "It's no secret that our allies don't agree with [the sanctions
policy]." 124 What the "agreement" demonstrated was that in the future
such matters would be determined, not through unilateral action on the
part of the alliance leader, but through allied consensus.1 25
The reappraisal by U.S. elites that was stimulated by the incident may
be illustrated by the difficulties encountered in attempting to revise the
1979 Export Administration Act and to formulate a coherent export con-
trol policy. The administration, the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives brought divergent approaches to the task.126
In April 1983, the Reagan Administration submitted a bill to Congress
that indicated a greater respect for its allies' economic independence than
had been the case at the outset of the incident. 127 The bill stated that it
would be U.S. policy to minimize the impact of export controls on pre-
123. President Reagan, in his radio address announcing the end of the pipeline sanctions,
asserted: "I believe this new agreement is a victory for all the allies. It puts in place a much
needed policy in the economic area to complement our policies in the security area. . . an
agreement with our allies which provides for stronger and more effective measures." Presiden-
tial Address, supra note 118.
124. Id.
125. Dam, supra note 99, at 51.
126. As of June, 1985 Congress has yet to reenact an updated version of the Export Ad-
ministration Act. Compare S. 2342, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. §2 and H.R. Rep. No. 257, Part I,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). On June 27, 1985, the Congress passed and sent to President
Reagan a bill extending the current version of the Export Administration Act until Sept. 30,
1989. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1985, at D4, col. 4. Extension of the status quo reflects Congres-
sional uncertainty over how to proceed and at least a temporary acceptance of the proposed
norm.
127. Dam, supra note 99, at 51.
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existing contracts and business activities in allied countries when these
controls are imposed for foreign policy reasons. The administration bill
also explicitly recognized the sanctity of contracts as a limitation which
would insulate many contracts from foreign policy export controls. Spe-
cifically, an "overriding national interest" exception protected existing
sales contracts requiring delivery within 270 days of the imposition of
restrictions. Although the bill strengthened the enforcement of national
security controls, the concessions on foreign policy controls indicated
that elite opinion in the executive branch had shifted. Although the Con-
gressional position is still in a state of flux, the administration's position
indicated an awareness that consultation with the allies and increased
information flow regarding alliance objectives, rather than the use of
political power by the United States, has become the norm of behavior on
trade issues within the Atlantic Alliance.
128
B. European Appraisal
European reaction to the lifting of the pipeline sanctions was uniform,
The incident consolidated European expectations of what their alliance
obligations were in peacetime concerning trade issues. Such consolida-
tion capped a process of norm formation that had accelerated during the
period of detente.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the lifting of the sanctions was
interpreted by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as the end of "inter-
vention into the sovereignty of foreign countries." 129 The value of East-
West trade was reaffirmed by West German elites as a political instru-
ment and a stabilizing factor in East-West relations. 130 Further, the nor-
mative implications of the lifting of sanctions were not missed. As Die
Welt commented, "Some good, however, has come out of this struggle in
the Western alliance over the past months because there is now a clearer
definition of a common and coordinated policy regarding trade with the
East." 131 This view, that the incident had clarified and reaffirmed com-
munity policy on the allocation of competence to prescribe and apply
norms of economic behavior during peacetime, was also evident among
the other European allies. The French Foreign Trade Minister, Michel
Jobert, echoed this theme: "We are urging the United States to regard us
as partners, to see that we are not part of a system controlled by its
128. Robinson, supra note 97, at 37-38.
129. Press Discusses Lifting of US. Pipeline Embargo, Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice [hereinafter cited as FBIS] (W. Eur.), Nov. 16, 1982, at J1.
130. Genscher on Trade After Shultz USSR Meeting, FBIS (W. Eur.), Nov. 16, 1982, at 53.
131. Press Discusses Lifting of US Pipeline Embargo, supra note 129, at J1.
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initiative." 132 Moreover, French reaction to the lifting of the sanctions
highlighted substantive differences within the Alliance on the trade is-
sue. France simply did not share the security objectives of U.S. embargo
policies, 133 refusing even to be party to the "informal agreement" among
the allies through which the Reagan Administration sought to save face
in lifting the sanctions.
134
Great Britain also refused to take part in the "informal agreement."
Foreign Secretary Pym emphasized that the sanctions policy and the de-
cision to end it were unilateral actions of the United States. 135 Britain,
however, was more conciliatory than any other European ally towards
the United States on the issue of East-West security principles. 136 The
British acknowledged that the alliance could not trade in ways that gave
the Soviets strategic or military advantages.137 However, the British ac-
knowledgement of shared security interests did not extend to trade in
commercial goods with less direct military applications.
At the other end of the world, the Japanese were also applauding the
lifting of the pipeline sanctions, since this would enable them to resume
fully their oil and gas projects with the Soviets.'138 The Japanese had
protested strongly139 the imposition of the sanctions, asserting that "the
United States need[ed] to listen to the voices of its Western allies."'14 In
addition, elite reaction in Japan welcomed the lifting of the pipeline sanc-
tions because, like the West Europeans, the Japanese wanted orders to
alleviate a recession in the steel sector.'
4 '
The allies generally maintained a uniform position regarding both the
sanctions policy and its withdrawal.' 42 They wanted no part of either.
So far as the allies were concerned, the United States was expecting too
much of the alliance in extending obligations for Western security
broadly to the economic area.143 The ability to trade with minimum in-
132. Jobert Comments on Lifting of Sanctions, FBIS (W. Eur.), Nov. 18, 1982, at K2.
133. Le Monde Views Decision, FBIS (W. Eur.), Nov. 17, 1982, at K2.
134. Leaders Comment on Lifting of U.S. Sactions, FBIS (W. Eur.), Nov. 17, 1982, at K1.
135. Pym on EastBloc Trade After Sanctions Lifted, FBIS (W. Eur.), Nov. 15, 1982, at Q1.
136. Id. at Q2.
137. Id.
138. MITI Lauds Lifting of U.S. Pipeline Sanctions, FBIS (Japan), Nov. 16, 1982, at C5.
139. Abe Confirms Protest, FBIS (Japan), July 20, 1982, at Cl.
140. Trade Minister Criticizes US. Economic Policy, FBIS (Japan), July 8, 1982, at Cl.
141. USSR Seeking Japanese Credits for Pipeline Equipment, FBIS (Japan), Oct. 19, 1982,
at Cl.
142. Italy maintained a low profile during the entire incident. However, Prime Minister
Giovanni Spadolini, in appraising the lifting of the sanctions, emphasized the consistency of
Italian policy during this incident in reserving its right to freedom of action in trade contracts.
See Spandolini Interviewed on Economy, US. Embargo, FBIS (W. Eur.), Nov. 17, 1982, at L5.
143. Soames, America and Europe: Can This Partnership Be Saved? 20 ATLANTIc CoM-
MUNrrY 331, 332 (1982).
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terference was considered by Europeans to be an aspect of political inde-
pendence that the United States must respect. 144
VII. Writer's Appraisal
The informal agreement reached on November 13, 1982 by the United
States and its European allies did nothing to impede completion of the
pipeline project. The pipeline was duly completed and is in operation. 145
As noted above, the agreement has also had little effect on the trade poli-
cies of the allies. The ban on new natural gas contracts did not affect the
long-term arrangements previously concluded by the Europeans and the
Soviet Union. No further restrictions on sales contracts were contem-
plated by the agreement, and its recommendations for stronger controls
on strategic items have not been implemented. Yet, despite the failure of
the agreement to alter the behavior of the Europeans, no new crisis over
East-West industrial technology sales has occurred within the alliance. 146
Rather, the agreement seems to represent a recognition by all parties of
an emerging norm that the scope of politico-military alliances does not
automatically extend to the peacqtime trade of commercial goods. 147
The outcome of the pipeline incident suggests that delegation of duties
144. Id. at 333. The utility of the sanctions was questioned even by Americans doing
business in Europe. Tittman, Extraterritorial Application of United States Export Control
Laws to Foreign Subsidiaries of United States Corporations: An American Lawyer's View from
Europe, 16 INT'L LAW. 730 (1982). Soviet commentators naturally also stressed as unneces-
sary and futile the U.S. attempt to restrict its allies' commercial transactions. See Gorsky,
EEC-USA: The Transatlantic Duel, INT'L Ars. (Moscow), Oct. 1982, at 24.
145. See Chronology 1984, supra note 1.
146. Hoffman, Western Europe.: Wait and Worry, 63 FOREIGN AFr. 632 (1985).
147. The applicability of this norm to other alliances will vary according to the relative
dominance of the state apparatus (as a concept distinct from society) in attempting to imple-
ment alliance policy. A key factor in establishing this dominance is the degree to which socie-
tal pressures condition state policies. See Katzenstein, supra note 6, at 16-18. As a predictive
matter, it is likely that when private interests are influential in economic matters, it will be
more difficult for the state to impose alliance policies that run counter to those interests. There
is also reason to believe, however, that the norm proposing freedom of peacetime commercial
transactions would be supported even within alliances in which the power of the dominant
state to enforce a strategy of trade denial is relatively unrestrained by internal pressures. See
Bunce, The Empire Strikes Back- The Transformation of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset
to a Soviet Liability, 39 INT'L ORG. 1 (1985). The rapid expansion of East-West trade during
the 1970s brought "a nine-fold increase from 1970 to 1981 of Western exports to the [Soviet]
bloc, and an eight-fold increase in the same period of Western imports from the Soviet bloc."
Id. at 36. This expansion resulted in Eastern Europe becoming more dependent on both the
West and the Soviet Union for markets and capital. Id. at 3. Bunce argues that the pressures
East-West trade placed on the command economies of Eastern Europe, the need for Western
banks to recycle petrodollars in Eastern Europe in the 1970s, and the global recessions of 1973-
74 and 1979-82 all served to limit, rather than expand, Soviet power over the Eastern alliance.
Id. at 44. This thesis suggests that it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to mobilize its
alliance partners to deny economic power to the West. In fact, because of diminishing returns
from its empire, the Soviet Union may be quite content to limit its control over state sover-
eignty to political and military affairs.
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within the alliance, especially in regard to the wealth process, is to be
determined by consultation, not imposition. Alliance duties are to be
carefully defined so as to respect the autonomy of each state. While the
United States might invoke alliance responsibilities in the name of collec-
tive security, or alternatively, issue unilateral export regulations on
grounds of its own national security, mere assertions of foreign policy
objectives will not justify extensions of U.S. sanctions to its allies.
The norm embodied in the informal agreement represents a crystalliza-
tion of expectations which developed over time in response to repeated
attempts by the United States to implement trade restrictions. The
Europeans have acted, and will continue to act in accordance with these
expectations. For a period following the pipeline'incident, the United
States also had begun to act in conformity with these expectations, with
the result that economic autonomy in commercial transactions was ac-
corded much more weight in the crafting of export control policy. How-
ever, on May 1, 1985, the Reagan Administration tried once again to get
its allies to cooperate in a trade embargo to counter a "security" threat
posed by Nicaragua. 148 Although this attempt to extend politico-mili-
tary responsibilities into the economic issue area seems to have been un-
successful,' 49 the Nicaragua "incident" offers an opportunity to test the
viability of the norm proposed here.
The new norm manifests a preference by most members of the Atlantic
Alliance that each state be free to engage in peacetime commercial trans-
actions, even at the risk of transferring power through the wealth process
to an adversarial alliance. The ability of these members to prevail sug-
gests, in a larger sense, that spheres of influence promoted by the frame-
work of collective security have their limits. Collective security
arrangements exist to safeguard the public order goal of national auton-
omy. 150 These collective arrangements are thus a means of achieving a
public order goal and not an end in themselves. The clear lesson of the
pipeline incident is that alliance members will strenuously take issue with
policies that they perceive as a threat to the very goals that the alliance
exists to promote.
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